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Empirical tests of reduced form models of default attribute a large fraction of observed credit spreads
to compensation for jump-to-default risk.  However, these models preclude a "contagion-risk'' channel,
where the aggregate corporate bond index reacts adversely to a credit event.  In this paper, we propose
a tractable model for pricing corporate bonds subject to contagion-risk. We show that when investors
have fragile beliefs (Hansen and Sargent (2009)), contagion premia may be sizable even if P-measure
contagion across defaults is small.  We find empirical support for contagion in bond returns in response
to large credit events. Model calibrations suggest that while contagion risk premia may be sizable,
jump-to-default risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points.
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Most empirical studies of structural models of default have found that only a small fraction of
observed credit spreads for investment grade debt can be explained in terms of compensation
for credit risk. (See Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984), Huang and Huang (2003), Eom,
Helwege and Huang (2004)). The problem is especially severe for investment grade bonds
with short maturities. Indeed, if ﬁrm value dynamics are speciﬁed as a diﬀusion process, then
structural models predict a negligible default probability for short maturity debt.
In contrast to structural models, reduced-form (or hazard rate) models of default abstract
from ﬁrm value dynamics and directly model default as a jump event. Reduced-form models
posit a process for the risk-neutral default intensity Q(t), and then value risky claims by
discounting at a default-adjusted rate under the risk-neutral measure. Under certain modeling
assumptions, the price of a corporate bond obtains the same analytic form as that found for a
risk-free bond (Lando (1998), Duﬃe and Singleton (1999)). Indeed, it is this tractability that
explains the popularity of reduced-form models. However, the strength of the reduced-form
framework (i.e., its tractability and ﬂexibility) is also its weakness: Because they provide little
in terms of economic theory for default dynamics, reduced form models oﬀer very limited “out-
of-sample” predictions about credit spreads. As such, they are as good (or as bad) as their
underlying assumptions regarding default intensity and recovery rate dynamics.
Most sources of risk found in structural models have an analogue in reduced form models.1
For example, just as common movements in ﬁrm values lead to risk premia for corporate bonds
in a structural framework, common movements in intensities justify these same risk premia
in the reduced form framework, since such risks are not mitigated by holding well-diversiﬁed
portfolios. However, reduced-form models have an additional channel for capturing compen-
sation for risk not found in (diﬀusion-based) structural models, namely, the (unpredictable)
jump-to-default (JTD) event itself. When this risk is priced, the risk-neutral intensity Q(t)
can be higher than the actual default intensity P(t). In fact, empirical studies of reduced-
form model ascribe a large part of the credit spread to this JTD risk-channel. For example,
Driessen (2005) estimates the jump-risk premium for 10-year BBB bonds in his benchmark






be 2.3. Similar results are reported by Berndt et al (2005), who instead focus on credit de-
fault swaps. We emphasize that these papers do not estimate the jump-risk premia directly.
That is, they do not investigate how their proxy for the pricing kernel covaries with bond
1Indeed, Duﬃe and Lando (2001) demonstrate that when one adds uncertainty to the true ﬁrm value in a
structural model, the model eﬀectively reduces to a reduced-form model.
1returns during credit events. Instead, researchers typically estimate the “traditional” channels
directly, and then simply attribute the residual to jump-to-default risk. Thus, the accuracy of
the jump-to-default risk premium estimate depends crucially on the model being well-speciﬁed.
However, we argue in this paper that large JTD risk-premia lead to a bit of a conundrum.
First, for JTD risk to be priced, it must be that JTD is not conditionally diversiﬁable.2 Second,
if JTD is indeed not conditionally diversiﬁable, then this implies that there should be another
source of credit risk-premium, namely, a contagion risk premium, which is due to a market-
wide adverse reaction to a given ﬁrm’s default. An implication of this argument is that models
which ignore contagion risk may not be well-speciﬁed, in turn leading to a JTD risk premium
that is biased upward.
Interestingly, when we consider a framework where JTD risk is priced because of its co-
variance with the returns of the corporate bond index, we ﬁnd that the JTD premium has an
upper bound of only a few basis points. The intuition for this result is straightforward: if there
are N = 1000 ﬁrms that compose the aggregate corporate bond market, then it is 1000-times
more likely for a given corporate bond to share in the contagion event than it is for that bond
to jump to default. A standard no arbitrage argument then implies that the market portfolio
loss would have to be approximately 1000-times smaller than the loss on the defaulting bond
for the contagion premium not to dwarf JTD premium. However, such a small impact on the
market portfolio would imply that the jump-to-default event would be almost idiosyncratic,
and therefore would not command a signiﬁcant risk premium. Below, we show that the JTD
premium is approximately linear, and the contagion premium quadratic, in the coeﬃcient con-
trolling the level of contagion. We ﬁnd that as we increase the value of this coeﬃcient, the
contagion risk premium ‘explains’ virtually all of the observed credit spread before the JTD
premium can reach a size larger than a few basis points.
This implication is problematic, however, since only JTD risk, and not contagion-risk, can
explain short-maturity spreads. This then strongly suggests that short-maturity spreads are
not due to jump-to-default risk, but rather to non-credit factors, such as liquidity-risk. Such
conclusions have important implications for optimal portfolio decisions, risk-management, and
welfare concerns.
We believe that contagion risk has been mostly ignored in the previous literature not
because it was deemed as unimportant, but rather due to technical reasons. Indeed, tractable
solutions for defaultable bonds had only been identiﬁed for those models that fell within the “no
jump at default” frameworks of Duﬃe, Schroeder and Skiadas (1996) and Duﬃe and Singleton
2This point has been made elegantly by Jarrow, Lando, Yu (2001).
2(1999), and the “Cox-process” framework described in Lando (1998). The tractability of these
frameworks stemmed directly from their assumption that no contagion risk was present.
One contribution of this paper is to identify a simple and economically intuitive framework
that tractably captures contagion risk. We propose a reduced-form framework that provides
analytic solutions for risky bond prices even though the model falls outside of the “no jump
at default” framework. In our model, an unexpected default of an individual ﬁrm leads to
a market-wide increase in credit spreads. Thus, jump-to-default risk is not conditionally di-
versiﬁable, and hence commands a risk premium. While this framework is consistent with
a counterparty-risk interpretation, it is most naturally interpreted as an updating of beliefs
about the economic environment due to an unexpected default event. Recent examples of a
credit event aﬀecting beliefs about defaults of other ﬁrms include the Enron default, where
beliefs about accounting quality across many ﬁrms were impacted, and the leveraged buyout
of RJR, which impacted the beliefs about how large a ﬁrm could be and still have outstanding
corporate bonds subject to the risk of an LBO.3
In our calibration below, we consider both jumps to default and the much more common
occurrence of a large jump in credit spreads (i.e., jump in risk-neutral intensity), both of which
can lead to updating and therefore contagion. In both cases, we conclude that the jump risk
premium is necessarily small.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether credit events are associated with a contagious
response. Therefore, we also perform an ‘event study’ on a large sample of corporate bond
returns. We identify months that include a surprise credit event (deﬁned as a large jump
in bond prices, identiﬁed ﬁrst by isolating large credit spread jumps, and then conﬁrmed by
actual news event) of an investment grade ﬁrm, and compare aggregated bond returns in those
months to non-event months. We ﬁnd that credit events lead to both market-wide increases in
credit spreads and to signiﬁcant spill-over returns in Treasury bonds, consistent with a ‘ﬂight
to quality’ interpretation. The contagion eﬀects are more pronounced for larger ﬁrms than for
smaller ﬁrms, and do not appear to be explained by a host of control variables.
Our paper builds on and combines two important strands of literature: event risk and
Bayesian updating of beliefs. Conditions for which jump-to-default is not priced have been
investigated by Jarrow, Lando and Yu (2005). They demonstrate that under some standard
APT-like assumptions4 that jump-to-default risk will not be priced if the default process is
assumed to follow a so-called “doubly stochastic” (or Cox) process. However, recent empiri-
3See Crabbe (1994), Yu (2005)
4These assumptions include: i) each ﬁrm constitutes a small fraction of the economy, ii) a ﬁnite fraction of
ﬁrms do not default simultaneously, and iii) marginal investors can diversify their bond portfolio holdings.
3cal ﬁndings question this doubly-stochastic assumption. For example, Das et al. (2006, 2007)
report that the observed clustering of defaults in actual data are inconsistent with this as-
sumption. Duﬃe et al (2009) use a fragility-based model similar to ours to identify a hidden
state variable consistent with a contagion-like response. Note that the focus of these papers
is on estimating the empirical default probability, whereas our focus is on pricing. Jorion and
Zhang (2007) ﬁnd contagious eﬀects at the industry level.5
Other papers investigating event risk include Jarrow and Yu (2001), who also provide a
model where the default of one ﬁrm aﬀects the intensity of another. However, their model
remains tractable only for a “small” number N of ﬁrms exposed to contagion-risk (e.g., JY
investigate only N = 2). In contrast, our model remains tractable regardless of the number of
ﬁrms that share in the contagious response. Such a framework is necessary for our purposes
since we want to investigate how large the jump-to-default risk premium can be when the
number of ﬁrms is large.6
Our approach shares many common features with those in the learning and contagion liter-
ature (Detemple (1986), Feldman (1989), David (1997), Veronesi (2000)). As in these papers,
the representative agent in our economy learns about a hidden state from observing aggregate
consumption. However, in addition in our model the agent learns from individual ﬁrms’ de-
faults history.7 Further, we identify a dynamically-consistent model of a representative agent
that has fragile beliefs (Hansen and Sargent (2009), Hansen (2007)). Dynamic consistency
allows us to price securities with long-dated cash ﬂows in a tractable manner. This framework
naturally generates a ﬂight-to-quality (i.e., a drop in risk free rates) caused by an unexpected
default, consistent with observation.
Our information-based mechanism for contagion is similar to that proposed by King and
Wadhwani (1990) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002), who investigate contagion across interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets. There is also a large empirical literature that studies contagion in
equity markets (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1992)) and in international ﬁnance (e.g., Bae, Karolyi
and Stulz (2003)). Theocharides (2007) investigates contagion in the corporate bond market
and ﬁnds empirical support for information-based transmission of crises.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature regarding
5Related, also see Jorion and Zhang (2009), Lando and Nielsen (2009).
6Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Hugonnier (2004) simplify the bond pricing formula of Duﬃe, Schroeder
and Skiadis (1996). Note, however, that the formula itself does not identify a tractable framework for pricing
contagion risk. Other models of contagion include Davis and Lo (2001), Sch¨ onbucher and Schubert (2001), and
Giesecke (2004).
7I addition, a minor technical diﬀerence between these papers and ours is that they use results on ﬁltering
theory for diﬀusions, whereas in our case information is revealed through jump-diﬀusion processes.
4jump to default risk, and explain why it is diﬃcult to capture contagion risk within a tractable
framework. In Section 3, we investigate a simple production economy as in Ahn and Thompson
(1988) and demonstrate that jump-to-default premia have an upper bound of a few basis points
if returns on the corporate bond index can proxy for the pricing kernel. In Section 4, we propose
a model that captures contagion-risk in a tractable framework. In Section 5, we investigate
the nature of risk-premia for our contagion-risk in a ‘fragile beliefs’ framework. In Section 6,
we investigate empirically the impact that major credit events has had on the corporate bond
index. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Reduced Form Models: Background
2.1 Sources of risk
In this section, we distinguish between jump-to-default risk and intensity risk in reduced form
models of default. In the following section, we investigate situations for which jump-to-default
risk will be priced.
2.1.1 Jump Risk
Reduced form models of default8 assume that default is triggered by the jump of an unpre-
dictable point process 1{<t}, where ˜  is the random default time. The intensities under the
historical probability measure P and risk neutral measure Q associated with this default
















t 1{>t} dt: (2)
Intuitively, these equations imply that the probability of a jump to default during the interval
(t;t + ∆t), conditional upon no prior default, is t ∆t.
Regardless of whether a model is partial equilibrium (where the pricing kernel is speciﬁed
exogenously) or general equilibrium (where the pricing kernel is derived endogenously from
the agent’s preferences and the technologies available), if d1{≤t} is contained in pricing kernel
dynamics, then this source of risk is priced, and Q
t will not equal P
t .9 As a simple example,
8See, for example, Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), Madan and Unal (1998), Duﬃe and Singleton (1997).
9This is the well-known result of the change of measure, i.e., Girsanov’s theorem for point processes. If the
Radon-Nykodim derivative has a common jump with the point process then its intensity may be modiﬁed under
the new measure. Examples of this are provided in equations (8) and (23) below.
5we specify the pricing kernel to be of the form
dΛ
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where r is the risk free rate and Γ is the size of the jump in the pricing kernel in the event
of default (i.e., d1{≤t} = 1). Consider a risky bond with (ex-dividend) price P(t) that, upon
default, becomes worthless upon paying out a terminal dividend equal to the fraction (1 − L)
of its pre-default market value. Its historical and risk-neutral dynamics are expressed as:
dP + (1 − L)P d1{≤t}
P













Combined, these equations imply:





















=  − r − LΓP1{>t}: (7)
Combining this with equation (6), we ﬁnd
Q
P = (1 + Γ): (8)
This simple example demonstrates two important implications of JTD risk. First, JTD
risk of ﬁrm-i is priced if and only if the pricing kernel jumps at the time of ﬁrm i’s default
(Γ ̸= 0). In that case, the ratio Q
P will diﬀer from unity, and the compensation (i.e., expected
excess return) for jump-to-default risk is




Hence, JTD can potentially explain high risk-premia on corporate bonds. Second, JTD trans-
lates into higher short term credit spreads since, solving equation (5) (for the case of constant
drifts and intensities)10 we see that
P(t;T) = e−(+PL)(T−t) 1{>t} = e−(r+QL)(T−t) 1{>t}: (9)
10Similar arguments hold in the more general case of non-constant drifts and intensities.
6Thus, the instantaneous credit spread is QL, which exceeds the instantaneous expected loss
PL if JTD is priced (that is, if Γ > 0). On the ﬂip side, this example shows that if many
ﬁrms are to have priced JTD risk, then each individual default must aﬀect the pricing kernel.
We emphasize that this JTD channel has no analogue in diﬀusion based structural models of
default.11
2.1.2 Intensity Risk
In addition to jump-to-default risk, the intensity P
t (and hence, in general, also Q
t ) itself is
speciﬁed to have stochastic dynamics, capturing the fact that the likelihood of default changes




 dt + dzP
t +   Γ dqt:
= Q
 dt + dz
Q
t +   Γ dqt: (10)
If changes in P are correlated with changes in the pricing kernel, then at least one of the
sources of risk dz and dq is priced, and the dynamics for P will diﬀer under the historical and
risk-neutral measures.
Equations (1)-(10) demonstrate that reduced-form models encapsulate two diﬀerent types
of risk premia. First, risk premia can be due to sources of risk that drive the dynamics of
the intensity (dzP, dq). These risk sources have an analogue in structural models of default,
where (dzP, dq) would drive the dynamics of distance-to-default. Duﬀee (1999) and Driessen
(2005) provide convincing evidence that such risk premia exist in reduced form models, whereas
Elton et al. (2001) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) provide similar evidence
that such risk premia exist in structural models. Second, the jump-to-default random variable
d1{≤t} can command a risk premium itself, in which case P ̸= Q. This source of risk has no
analogue in diﬀusion-based structural models of default, and hence can potentially help explain
the empirical failures of structural models. We emphasize that these risk premia are empirically
distinguishable, both in time-series and in cross-section. In time series, for example, d1{≤t} is
priced only if there is a market-wide response at the default event. In cross-section, abstracting
from taxes and liquidity, only jump-to-default risk can generate credit spreads that are higher
than expected loss rates at the very short end of the yield curve.
11For a structural model with jumps, see Zhou (2001).
72.2 Conditions for Jump-to-Default Risk to be Priced
In equation (3), we have simply assumed that jump-to-default risk is priced. One major focus
of this paper is to investigate the conditions for which jump-to-default risk is priced for the
typical12corporate bond. Recently, there has been considerable research on this topic. For
example, by extending the arguments implicit in the APT framework, Jarrow, Lando and Yu
(2005) discuss the conditions for which no systematic jump-to-default-risk exists. Essentially,
their results show that if the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) Conditional on the state variables driving intensities, default events are independent.
(ii) A large number of bonds are available for trading,
then jump-risk is conditionally diversiﬁable, and therefore should not command a risk-premium.
There are at least two scenarios where condition i) would not hold, and thus jump-risk
would be priced. First, there can be systemic risk in the sense that several ﬁrms can default






̸= 0 ∀ i;j ∈ [1;N]). Intuitively, if the number of
ﬁrms N is large enough that a non-negligible part of the economy defaults at the same date,
then such a risk would command a risk-premium. However, there is little empirical support
for such a notion. (Of course, there is always the concern of a ‘Peso-problem’).
Second, there can be contagion-risk in the sense that the default of one ﬁrm can trigger
an increase in the risk (i.e., an increase in the intensity) of default of other ﬁrms. Mathemat-





̸= 0 ∀ i;j ∈ [1;N]. In this paper, we show how
introducing contagion risk allows jump-to-default risk to be priced, and then demonstrate the
quantitative restrictions contagion risk imposes on the size of the jump-to-default premia.
Unfortunately, accounting for contagion risk destroys the tractability of the previously
proposed models in the literature. Indeed, the empirical literature has focused on those models


















However, as noted by Duﬃe, Schroeder and Skiadas (DSS, 1996), Duﬃe and Singleton (1999)
and Lando (1998), when there is contagion-risk, then equation (11) is typically not equal to
equation (12).
12We emphasize that this paper focuses on the JTD premia for the typical, or average bond. There is little
doubt that a credit event associated with the largest ﬁrms in the economy would command signiﬁcantly larger
JTD premia.
8An example where the equality between (11) and (12) does not hold is the (N = 2)
counterparty-risk model of Jarrow and Yu (JY 2001):
Q
1 (t) = a11 + a12 1
{2≤t} (13)
Q
2 (t) = a21 1
{1≤t} + a22: (14)
Intuitively, this model captures the notion that a default of one ﬁrm aﬀects the intensity/probability
of future default of another ﬁrm. Unfortunately, however, this framework becomes intractable
as N becomes large, even for the simplest case where the coeﬃcients {aij} are constants.
Below, we propose a model that can capture contagion across an arbitrarily large number of
ﬁrms.13 While our model can be interpreted as capturing counter-party risk as in JY, it will be
most natural to interpret it as capturing contagion through Bayesian updating of beliefs. Most
importantly, it will provide a tractable framework even when the number of ﬁrms sharing in
the contagion is large. Before we introduce the model, however, we provide a simple framework
that suggests jump-to-default premia have an upper bound of a few basis points if the pricing
kernel can be proxied by returns on the market portfolio.
3 Comparing Jump Risk Premia and Contagion Premia
In this section, we investigate within a general equilibrium production economy the relative
sizes of jump risk premia and contagion premia when there are a large number of “ﬁrms” N.
Recall that JLY used APT-like arguments to show that if the jump-risk is conditionally diversi-
ﬁable, and N becomes large, then the jump risk premia goes to zero. Here, we generalize their
results by allowing for contagion risk. Jump-risk will thus not be conditionally diversiﬁable in
this model.
We consider a production economy with linear technologies as in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross
(1985) and Ahn and Thompson (1988). For reasons of tractability, we consider N identical
production technologies with return dynamics:14
dSi
Si
= dt + 0 dz + i dzi − ΓD
(






dqj − P dt
)
; (15)





















14We emphasize that choosing identical ﬁrm dynamics does not generate our results, but only makes the
argument more transparent. As the APT literature has shown previously, similar arguments hold for the
‘typical ﬁrm’ so long as each ﬁrm is ‘small’.
9where dz is a Brownian motion common to all ﬁrms, the {dzi} are idiosyncratic Brownian
motions orthogonal to each other and to dz, and the {dqi} are Poisson random variables with
intensity P. The term ΓDdqi is meant to capture a “credit event” associated with ﬁrm-i,
whereas the term ΓCdqj̸=i is meant to capture ﬁrm-i’s contagious response to a “credit event”
associated with investment-j. As such, we anticipate ΓD > ΓC. That is, we expect the credit
event associated with ﬁrm-i to aﬀect returns on ﬁrm-i signiﬁcantly more than the returns
on the overall index. As we will see in Tables 1-3 below, this result occurs naturally in our
framework.









subject to her budget constraint
dWt =
{






































Here, we have deﬁned i to be the proportion of wealth placed into investment technology
i. Note that the budget constraint implicitly assumes the existence of a risk-free security.
However, in the end, the risk free rate rt will be chosen so that the representative agent holds
this security in zero net supply (Cox, Ingersoll, Ross (1985)).
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The ﬁrst order condition are:
@
@C
: 0 = e−tC−
t − JW (19)
@
@k
: 0 = WtJW
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Due to the symmetric nature of all returns, and due to the fact that in equilibrium the risk
free rate r will adjust so that the bond is held in zero net supply, it follows that the agent
will place a constant fraction of her wealth in each investment technology: i = 1
N ∀i. Hence,























dqi − P dt
]
: (21)
As we discuss below, the main ﬁndings of this section are due to the functional form of the















Therefore, we can express marginal utility dynamics (which takes on the role of pricing kernel
in this model) as
dJW
JW

















dqi − P dt
]
:
One implication of this result is that the “credit events” {dqi} are priced, since they show up
in the pricing kernel. Moreover, as can be seen in analogy with equations (3) and (8), the ratio















(ΓD + (N − 1)ΓC)
]−
: (23)
Plugging equation (22) into the consumption ﬁrst order condition, we see that the price-
consumption ratio is a constant:
C = AW: (24)
More relevant for the issue at hand, plugging equation (22) into the portfolio weight ﬁrst order
condition, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium excess return for each investment technology follows


















11Equation (25) has a straightforward interpretation: The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is











As in the standard diﬀusive model, the diﬀusion premium is a combination of relative risk








becomes negligible as the number of ﬁrms N increases.
The second term on the right hand side is the contribution of excess return due to the jump
sources of risk ({dqi}). It is useful to decompose this second term into a jump-risk component























It is worth noting that when the contagion-risk parameter ΓC is greater than zero, then a
jump-event leads to a market-wide response in returns, and both components contribute to
investment returns. However, if ΓC = 0, then not only is the contagion-risk zero (by deﬁnition),


















That is, without contagion risk, jump-to-default becomes idiosyncratic, and its associated risk




, just as the idiosyncratic volatility term does in equation (26). Hence,
JTD premia can be sizeable only if contagion risk is sizeable.
Now, let us calibrate this model using equation (25). We emphasize that, up to this point,
we have not characterized the size of the jump ΓD in equation (15). Historically, recovery
rates on corporate bonds has been approximately 40%.15 Hence, when investigating jump-to-
default, we set ΓD = 0:6. Separately, in our empirical section, we investigate credit events
where a ﬁrm’s bond price fell on average by 10%, so when studying that case, we set ΓD ≈ :10.
Throughout, we set N = 1000, since there were approximately 103 ﬁrms with investment-grade
status over the time period that we investigate empirically.
15See Moody’s (2005) Report.
12Historically, the non-callable BBB-Treasury spread on 4-year debt has been estimated to be
about 150bp (See, for example, Huang and Huang (2003), Chen et al (2009)). Approximately
20-25bp of that spread covers historical losses,16 so, conservatively, the risk premium has
been approximately 125bp. Here, we look for an upper bound for the jump-to-default risk
premium, so we set the diﬀusion premium to zero. Thus, the entire 125bp risk premium is
being attributed to contagion risk and jump-to-default risk only. In Tables 1-3, we decompose
the risk premium for these two components for diﬀerent values of the risk aversion coeﬃcient
 for an economy with N = 1000 investment technologies. In particular, using equation (25)
and setting the volatility components to zero, we identify the implicit value for the contagion
risk parameter ΓC, and in turn, the contagion premium and jump-to-default premium. To
calibrate this model, we use the historical one year default rate for BBB rated bonds of 0.2%
obtained from Moody’s.17 As an upper bound, we set the instantaneous default intensity to
P = 0:002.
We ﬁnd that for risk aversion coeﬃcients ranging from  = 5 to  = 20, we can attribute
only 2.7bp to 5.6bp of risk premium to jump-to-default risk – the remaining 120bp being
attributed to contagion risk. Accounting for realistic levels of diﬀusion risk, liquidity risk,
taxes, etc., reduces this number even further. Indeed, if instead of (BBB-Treasury) spread,
we begin with credit default swap data, which reduces the spread to approximately 100bp,
and then subtract 20-25bp for expected losses and 20bp18 for diﬀusion risk, then we obtain
a conservative estimate of 55bp for “unexplained risk premium”. Under this more realistic
calibration, we ﬁnd that the premium due to jump-risk varies from 1.8bp to 3.6bp as we go
from  = 5 to  = 20. As a ﬁnal example more closely related to our empirical work, if
instead of jumps-to-default, we consider jumps in spreads that generate a 10% loss in the bond
(i.e., ΓD = 0:10), with an intensity equal to our empirical estimate of 0.2%, we ﬁnd that the
premium for jump-risk varies from 0.6bp to 1.2bp as we go from  = 5 to  = 20. Hence, there
appears to be no reasonable calibration where jump-to-default risk is large when the number
of ﬁrms N is large. Instead, contagion risk must make up almost the entire unexplained risk
premia, and thus can be quite large, as shown in Tables 1-3.
16See Moody’s (2005) report, Elton (2001) et al.
17We emphasize that this intensity estimate signiﬁcantly overestimates the historical intensity associated with
default over a one month horizon. Indeed, we are aware of only a handful of ﬁrms that have defaulted with
investment-grade status. Furthermore, the majority of these did not possess investment-grade spreads – that is,
the market realized that these bonds were not truly investment-grade, and that the rating agencies were slow
to downgrade.
1820bp for diﬀusion risk is consistent with the ﬁndings of Driessen (2005) for a 10Y BBB bond.
13The interpretation of these results are as follows: The no arbitrage relation








implies that jump risk premia are a product of three numbers: i) the probability of a jump
event, ii) the jump in the pricing kernel conditional on the event, and iii) the fractional loss con-
ditional on the event. Equations (27)-(28) emphasize that jump premia and contagion premia,

















. Even though we estimate ΓD to be approximately thirty times larger than ΓC, (i.e.,
the ﬁrm suﬀering the credit event performs 30-times worse than does the index which shares
in the contagion), the typical bond is (N − 1) ≈ 1000-times more likely to suﬀer a contagion
event than a credit event. Thus, the contagion risk premium is approximately 1000
30 ≈ thirty




found in this example matches well with our empirical ﬁndings, as we discuss below.
The reason these magnitudes necessarily occur in this framework is because the functional
form of the pricing kernel implies that the JTD risk premia can be sizeable only if ΓC is





(ΓD + (N − 1)ΓC)
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implies that equations (27)-(28) simplify to
( − r)
jump ≈ PΓCΓD (32)
( − r)
contagion ≈ P(N − 1)Γ2
C: (33)
Note that the JTD premium is approximately linear, and the contagion premium quadratic, in
ΓC. These equations make transparent why the JTD premium ( − r)
jump cannot be large: the
product PΓD ≈ 10−2 implies that we need ΓC > 10−1 for JTD premia to be at least 10bp,
but with N = 1000 such a magnitude would imply a contagion premium of P(N − 1)Γ2
C ≈
10Γ2
C ≈ 1000bp! However, since observed bond premia are approximately 100bp, we are forced
to calibrate ΓC < 0:03 , in turn leading to small JTD premia.
It is worth noting that, under this approximation, the pricing kernel is approximately















14The implication is that if we can use returns on corporate bond indices to identify risk premia,
then the argument above implies that JTD premia have an upper bound of a few basis points.
4 A Tractable Model of Contagion-Risk
In the previous section, we provided an argument that suggests that, whereas contagion risk
premia can be substantial, JTD premia have an upper bound of a few basis points if expected
bond returns can be explained in terms of covariation with corporate bond indices. Note that
this situation ignores the possibility that jumps to default are priced because they impact,
e.g., the stock market or aggregate consumption, without necessarily impacting corporate bond
indices. Moreover, while the model provides simple and intuitive results, the assets considered
are more readily interpreted as productive technologies rather than risky bonds with a speciﬁed
maturity. In particular, the previous framework does not generate a term structure of credit
spreads.
In this section, we specialize our focus to the pricing of risky bonds that jump to default.
We then provide a tractable reduced form framework for pricing risky debt in the presence of
contagion-risk in spite of the fact that many ﬁrms share in the contagion risk and that the
model falls outside of the “no jump at default” condition.
Consider an economy where the true state of nature ˜ S is unknown and can be in any one
of s ∈ (1;M) states. At date-t, investors do not know what state the economy is in, but form
a prior s(t) ≡ Prob(˜ S = s|Ft), where Ft is the investors’ information set at date-t. In this
economy there are N defaultable ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ (1;N) with random default times i
driven by point processes characterized by default intensities. In particular, conditional upon





   






   




That is, we can interpret is(t−) as the date-t default intensity for ﬁrm-i conditional upon
being in state-s. Below, we will assume that, conditioning both on the state-s and the paths
is(t−)|
T
t=0 for some distant future date-T, the default events across ﬁrms are independent. In
technical terms, we are assuming a doubly-stochastic, or Cox-process conditional upon being
in a particular state-s.19 We emphasize, however, because agents do not know the correct
state-s, our model falls outside of the Cox-process framework, as will be made clear below in,
for example, equation (44).
19See, for example, Lando (1998)
15Since investors do not know the actual state of nature, their estimate of the actual default
intensity 
P


















   







Thus, conditional on investors’ information, the default intensity of ﬁrm i is equal to a weighted







We assume that investors continuously update their estimates of the {s(t)} conditional
upon whether or not they observe a default event during the interval dt. A direct application
of Theorem 19.6 page 332 in Lipster and Shiryaev (see also their example 1 p. 333) gives the


















We note that this process has many intuitive properties. First, if the prior s(t) = 1 for some
state-s (and thus 
s′(t) = 0 for all other s′), then there is no updating. That is, in an economy
where the agents know for sure the intensity of the ﬁrms, then there is no learning to be
done. Second, when no default is observed over an interval dt, then investors revise downward
the ‘high-default’ states of nature (i.e., those s with is(t−) > 
P
i (t−)), and in turn revise
upward the ‘low-default’ states of nature (i.e., those s with is(t−) < 
P
i (t−)). Conversely,
when a default is observed over an interval dt, investors revise upward those high-default states
of nature, and in turn revise downward those low-default states of nature. Third, note that
s(t) ≡ E
[
˜ S = s
   
 Ft
]
is a martingale in that Et [ds(t)] = 0, as can be seen from equations (36)







20We also provide a heuristic derivation of this result based solely on Bayes’ rule in Appendix 8.2. We note
that it would be straightforward to extend the model to allow for unobserved random transitions between states.


















Finally, if we make the additional assumption that, for the typical ﬁrm-i, the conditional
intensities is(t) are increasing in s:
i1(t) < i2(t) < ::: < iM(t); (41)
then we can show that the default intensity i(t) increases when some other ‘typical’ ﬁrm-i′
defaults. Indeed, for the special case where the conditional intensities {is(t)} are assumed to
































































for ﬁrms i;i′ satisfying equation (41).
The model speciﬁed by equations (37) and (38) is reminiscent of the counterparty risk
example of JY given in equations (13)-(14) above in that the intensity of default 
P
i (t) for
ﬁrm-i increases when some other ﬁrm-k defaults. In contrast to JY, however, contagion is
explicitly modeled as a result of the updating of beliefs. In addition to providing a mechanism
for generating contagion in the absence of direct counter-party risk (such as in the Enron and
RJR LBO events), the advantage of this framework is that it remains tractable even when
the number of ﬁrms N that share in the contagion is large. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the survival
































This result follows from the fact that the intensity of default for ﬁrm-i jumps at the same date
that the default occurs. That is, our model falls outside of the ‘no-jump’ framework of DSS,
or the Cox-process framework of Lando (1998), and Duﬃe and Singleton (DS 1999).
Not only does our framework tractably account for a large number of ﬁrms sharing in
the contagion, but, as we demonstrate below, our framework remains tractable even if the
intensities {is(t)} follow aﬃne or squared-Gaussian stochastic processes.22 Moreover, one can
easily choose dynamics to maintain the ordering implied in equation (41). For example, if the
{is(t)} are speciﬁed as
is(t) = ais + (bis)
⊤ Xi(t); (45)
with positive constants ais, positive vectors bis, and Xi(t) > 0 generated from square root dy-
namics (Duﬃe and Kan (1996)), ordering is maintained if the constraints (ai1;bi1) < (ai2;bi2) <
::: < (aiM;biM) are imposed. Alternatively, we can specify intensity dynamics as
dis(t) = i (is − is(t))dt + i
√
is(t)dZi(t); (46)
where the constraints (i1(0);i1) < (i1(0);i2) < ::: < (iM(0);iM) are imposed.23 We
use this alternative below. In both examples, survival probabilities and the prices of typical
defaultable claims, such as risky bonds and credit derivatives, can be obtained in closed-form
at little additional cost over and above the traditional framework that ignores contagion. This
feature is essential if one wishes to price, for example, collateralized debt obligations in a model
that captures contagion over a large number of ﬁrms.
Although the model presented above is a reduced-form model, it is easily reconciled with
the structural framework following the intuition of Duﬃe and Lando (DL 2000). DL show that,
in contrast to a standard structural model (e.g., Merton (1974)), if the underlying ﬁrm value
is imperfectly observed by investors, then from their point of view the default time becomes
inaccessible in that default arrives as a surprise event. Our framework can be interpreted as
an extension of DL’s model to multiple ﬁrms that share a common (but unknown) accounting
21A proof is provided in appendix 8.3
22The aﬃne restriction on the {is(t)} is useful only for obtaining closed form solutions for prices or survival
probabilities. The ﬁltering equation for the prior s(t) holds for arbitrary (positive integrable) conditional
intensity processes.
23That these conditions are suﬃcient to insure the ordering of intensities across states follows immediately from
the following observation. Suppose, is(0) > is′(0). The only way the order can change is if is(t) = is′(t) at
some t > 0 (because of their sample paths are continuous). But then d(is(t) − is′(t)) = i(is − is′)dt > 0.
18accuracy.24 The unexpected default of one ﬁrm will trigger an updating of beliefs by investors
about the shared ‘accounting quality’, and hence will aﬀect the perceived likelihood of default
of other ﬁrms in the economy.
Up to this point, the state variable dynamics have been speciﬁed under the historical
measure. In the following section we address the issue of pricing defaultable securities in the
presence of contagion risk and systematic jump risk.
5 Pricing Risky Bonds
The framework in the previous section assumes that agents are uncertain about the level of
default risk in the economy, and that they learn about the fundamental state from the history
of observed defaults. Given the rarity of the latter, it is natural to assume that agents are
particularly concerned about estimation errors when assessing the state. To allow for such
a concern (and the associated potential source of risk-adjustment), we build on the fragile
beliefs framework of Hansen and Sargent (2009) and Hansen (2007). Speciﬁcally, we specify
that aggregate consumption follows a jump-diﬀusion process where the jump intensity (and
therefore, the expected consumption growth) depends upon a hidden state. As shown by
Hansen and Sargent (2009), if agents have fragile beliefs about their estimate of the state,
then learning dynamics carry speciﬁc risk-premia. Here we extend their model by allowing
agents to use other sources of information in addition to past aggregate consumption to learn
about the state. Speciﬁcally, in our model agents also learn from realized default events,
since states with high default rates and, in turn, high credit spreads, are associated with low
expected consumption growth.25 Even though consumption does not jump contemporaneously
with default events, the concern for fragility generates a risk-premium associated with the
probabilities of being in the diﬀerent states. In particular, as can be seen in equations (61)
and (62) below, asset prices are equal to weighted averages of prices conditional upon being in
state-s. However, those states of nature associated with higher expected default rates/lower
expected consumption growth will be weighted more heavily. That is, in regards to pricing,
fragile preferences will eﬀectively tilt ‘risk-neutral’ probabilities toward poorer economic states.
The implication is that risk-neutral contagion, i.e., price contagion, may be signiﬁcantly larger
than the level of contagion implied under the empirical measure. Interestingly, even though
the representative agent displays fragility, his marginal valuation is dynamically-consistent,
24This model is available upon request.
25Consistent with our model, Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009) demonstrate that credit spreads predict
future GDP growth.
19implying that we can price long-dated claims using the gradient of the agent’s marginal utility.26
We assume that the aggregate dividend, which in this exchange economy will equal aggre-
gate consumption, follows the jump-diﬀusion process
dlogCt = dt +  dZ(t) − ΓdN0; (47)
where the intensity of the Poisson process dN0 is state-dependent:
E[dN0|s] = 0;s dt: (48)





E[dlogCt|˜ St = s] =  − Γ0;s; (49)











=  − Γ
P
0 (t): (50)
In the previous literature (e.g., David (1997) and Veronesi (2000)), agents update their esti-
mate of the state likelihood s(t) based solely on their observation of aggregate consumption.27
In contrast to these papers, we allow agents to update their beliefs regarding the state of nature
using information from both aggregate consumption and the realized history of defaults. In
particular, agents will attribute a greater probability of being in poor economic states upon
observing either a jump in aggregate consumption N0(t) or a jump-to-default of an individual





















26Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2009) show that the T2 operator of Hansen and Sargent (HS 2007) leads to
dynamically consistent preferences if it is combined with a T1 operator that displays time-separable homothetic
preferences. This result is in contrast to the approach of HS (2007), where one needs to solve recursively the
one-period pricing problem in order to price long-dated claims, which is numerically cumbersome.
27In David (1997) and Veronesi (2000), consumption follows a diﬀusion process, in contrast to the jump-
diﬀusion process studied here. However, this is merely a technical diﬀerence.
20We note that in time-separable frameworks such as David (1997) and Veronesi (2000), jumps
in the {s}, which imply jumps in the expected growth rate of consumption, do not carry
a risk-premium, since changes in their pricing kernel U′(c) ∼ C(t)− are generated only by
contemporaneous changes in consumption, and not changes in the expected growth rate. How-
ever, in the fragile beliefs framework, these jumps will be priced. In particular, we assume a
representative agent with the following preferences:
• Conditional upon observing state s ∈ (1;M), the agent has log-preferences. That is, the
agent ranks consumption lotteries in state-s according to the (state contingent) index
V (Ft|s), which satisﬁes:





• To rank consumption streams unconditionally, the agent displays fragile beliefs. That
is, the agent combines the conditional utility indices using a preference for robustness
parameter  via:









sV (Ft|s) +  s logs
)}
; (54)
where we have used the shorthand notation s = (s|Ft).
Hence, to solve for the preferences of this agent, we ﬁrst need to solve for the conditional
utility in equation (53), and then solve for the fragile beliefs in equation (54).
5.1 Conditional Log-Utility
The solution to equation (53) is standard (e.g., Hansen (2007)):
V (Ft|s) = logCt + Bs; (55)





The pricing kernel conditional on being in state-s is given by:









where the state-contingent spot rate equals










Given the solution to the conditional utility in equation (55), we can then solve for the utility












It therefore follows that the present value P(X) of a future random cash-ﬂow ˜ XT paid at time










XT |St = s
]
; (61)
where the tilted (or ‘risk neutral’) probabilities Q
s (t) are deﬁned via
Q
s (t) = s(t)s(t): (62)
5.3 Pricing kernel
This framework, which builds on Hansen and Sargent (2007), combines fragility (their T2
operator) with time-separable utility conditional on a state. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein
(2009) show that such a framework is dynamically-consistent, implying that prices of securities
with long-dated cash ﬂows can be supported by a pricing kernel with the following dynamics:
dΛ(t)
Λ(t)






































Here we price two types of securities with long-dated cash ﬂows: (i) the risk-free zero-
coupon curve, and (ii) the risky (defaultable) zero-coupon curve.
28In an earlier version of this paper, we exogenously speciﬁed the pricing kernel to be a sum of terms linear
in s(t) (and 
Q
s (t)). The preferences of Hansen (2007) provide a general equilibrium justiﬁcation for such a
speciﬁcation.
225.4 The Risk-free zero-coupon bond with maturity T (i.e., ~ X = 1).























Note that zero-coupon bond prices are convex combinations of standard exchange economies













5.5 Defaultable zero-coupon bond price ~ X = 1
{i>T}.
We assume that the default intensity of ﬁrm i ∈ (1;N) in a state s follows a CIR process:
dis(t) = i (is − is(t))dt + i
√
is(t)dZi(t); (69)
with (is > 
is′) and (is(0) > 
is′(0)) for those states (s; s′) that satisfy (0s > 
0s′). In other
words, we specify the model so that long run default rates are higher in those states with lower
expected growth rates for aggregate consumption. We assume the Zi(t) Brownian motions are
uncorrelated across ﬁrms and with aggregate consumption.29








































29We can relax this assumption, but at the cost of increased model complexity. We have chosen to maintain
this more parsimonious framework since our focus is on the relative size of contagion and JTD risk premia, and





is the price of the risky bond conditional upon being in state-s, and where the deterministic
functions Ai;s();Bi() satisfy a system of ODE’s solved in closed-form by Cox-Ingersoll and
Ross (1985).












s is(t) ≡ 
Q
i (t): (73)






















where we have used equations (56), (60) and
∑
s ss = 1. Interpreting, the tilted Q-
probabilities Q
s (t) = s(t)s(t) used for pricing are higher than the actual probabilities s(t)
for those states-s associated with low expected consumption growth and high expected default
rates.
5.6 Credit Risk Premium
As in Section 3, we are interested in comparing the risk premia associated with jump-to-
default risk and contagion risk. Because we assume that the Brownian motions Zi(t) which
drive is(t) are purely idiosyncratic, risky bonds command only jump risk-premia. Note that in
this parsimonious model, the only state variables in this economy are the probabilities {s(t)},
which according to equation (38) update as s(t)
jump ⇒ s(t)(is(t)=
P
i (t)) when a jump occurs.









The jump premia can be decomposed into three sources: (i) JTD premia, (ii) contagion
premia, and (iii) premia due to consumption jumps. These last two channels impact the price
24of Bk indirectly via its impact on the risk-adjusted probability of the state Q
s (t) ≡ s(t)s(t).







































































Here, the ﬁrst term represents the JTD premium. The second term encompasses both the
contagion premium (i ∈ (i;N)), and the premium for consumption jumps (i = 0).
5.7 A Calibration exercise
As opposed to the production economy of Section 3, jump to default is priced in this economy
not because of its impact on the corporate bond portfolio, but rather because it lowers expected
consumption growth via a learning channel. As such, JTD premia are not mechanically limited
to a few basis points as they were in that model. Here, we investigate how large the JTD
premium can be in a fragile beliefs framework.
For parsimony, we assume that there are only S = 2 states. We therefore have ten parame-
ters to calibrate: (; ΓG; ΓB; C; ; G(t); G; B; ; ; ). We choose C to match historical
consumption volatility of 0.02, and  to match historical consumption growth of 0.018.30
Although aggregate consumption is measured only quarterly, and with signiﬁcant noise, we
limited the size of jumps in consumption to 0.004. We also match well the historical (1Y,
5Y, 10Y, 20Y) BBB cumulative default rates (obtained from Moody’s) of (0.002, 0.021, 0.049,
0.121). We limit the volatility of short term credit spreads to 30bp, and pricing kernel volatility
to 100bp (twice the estimates of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)).
In all of our calibrations we also impose that the contagion premium be positive, as it is
consistent with our empirical results in the next section. This requires two things. First, we
need to impose the ordering between default intensities and long run means discussed with
equation (69), so that a default event implies bad news about future default probabilities.
Second, we need that eﬀect to dominate the risk-free rate eﬀect. Indeed, interestingly, a
default event triggers a “ﬂight-to-quality”, that is, a decrease in the risk-free rate as we update
towards worse economic conditions. This has a positive impact on the prices of long-lived
30See, for example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004).
25bonds through the discount channel, which could, in principle, dominate the negative eﬀect
of increased default likelihoods. We impose in our calibration (consistent with what we ﬁnd
empirically below) that the net eﬀect is negative.
In all cases, we found the JTD premium to be under 7bp. The intuition is the following:





































If we want to limit pricing kernel volatility (i.e., maximum Sharpe ratio) to be below 100bps,
then it follows that, with N = 1000 and 
P




















to under 10bp. Imposing the additional restrictions discussed
above reduces this upper bound even further. We also, ﬁnd that contagion risk tends to
be more important at longer maturities than at short maturities and much larger than the
JTD premium if the ratio of long-run default intensities is larger than its current value (i.e.,
iB
iG > iB
iG). The intuition for this result can be seen from the excess return equation (76). It
shows that the JTD risk-premium is solely tied to the diﬀerence between instantaneous default
intensities. However, the contagion premium is tied to the impact on surviving bond prices of
an increased weight put on the bad state. That contagion price impact depends crucially on
the ratio of long-run default intensities across states and more so for longer maturity bonds.
Ultimately, the magnitude of the contagion risk is not pinned down uniquely by our model
(as it depends on the relative magnitude of parameters and in particular, on the long-run
values of the default intensities across states). It is an empirical matter how large that eﬀect
is in the data. We turn to this next.
6 Empirical Analysis
We have shown that for JTD to be priced large credit events should have market wide im-
plications either via direct contagion to bond portfolios (section (3)) or because they convey
information about the “hidden” state of the economy (section (4)). In both cases, reasonable
calibrations also imply that contagion risk premia should be more signiﬁcant quantitatively,
than JTD risk-premia. We explore these two implications in this section.
Our empirical work is motivated as follows: if credit events are priced, we expect the
main source of risk to stem from events that are surprises to investors. Unexpected credit
events, then, should be identiﬁable as those where an individual ﬁrm’s bond exhibits a large
26jump in its spread. We therefore investigate empirically the impact that such credit events
have on the market. In particular, if these events are priced, then we expect them to be
associated with increases in aggregate credit spreads, and possibly also have a negative impact
on equities. Furthermore, consistent with the implications of the general equilibrium framework
in Section 5, we investigate whether such jumps are associated with ‘ﬂights-to-quality’ aﬀecting
risk-free rates.31
Regardless of whether the contagion is due to ‘counterparty risk’ or to ‘updating-of-beliefs’,
one would expect that jumps in the yield spreads of larger, ‘safer’ ﬁrms would produce a greater
impact on the market portfolio than would credit events of ‘riskier’ ﬁrms, since such events
would be less surprising. As such, we limit our empirical investigation to investment-grade
bonds. We note that few investment-grade ﬁrms default while holding the rating. Thus, if
these ﬁrms do eventually default, that event is likely to be anticlimactic and would not likely
cause a market-wide response. Consequently, our credit events consist largely of jumps in
spreads, not defaults.
6.1 Data
In order to gather a suﬃciently large number of credit events in the investment-grade market,
we use the Fixed Income Database (FID), which contains month-end trader quotes from Jan-
uary 1973-March 1998. These data have the advantage of reasonably good quality price data
(see Warga (1991) and Warga and Welch (1993)) over a long time series.
We calculate corporate bond spreads as the diﬀerence between the bond’s yield to maturity
(YTM) and the interpolated YTM on a Treasury bond with a similar maturity. The Treasury
yields are the Federal Reserve’s Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) daily series, using only
yields from this series in time periods when the bond is actually auctioned. We use actual CMT
yields when the corporate bonds have the same maturity as the CMT bonds and interpolated
YTMs (using the Nelson-Siegel (1987) method) for the other maturities.32
We use trader quotes and delete matrix prices from the analysis, as suggested by Warga
(1991). We consider spreads on all U.S. corporate bonds rated investment-grade in the FID as
long as they are not private placements, medium term notes, or Euro-bonds. We delete oﬀerings
by government-sponsored enterprises and supranational organizations, as well as mortgage-
backed or other asset-backed securities and bonds that are convertible into preferred stock.
31Note that we do not investigate incidences of major spread decreases, since the eﬀect of these jumps on the
‘market portfolio’ is not expected to be symmetric.
32Nelson-Siegel interpolation requires estimates of the rate of decay of the regressors, . We use 400 values of
 to obtain the most eﬃcient estimate of the yield curve for each day in the sample. We use  to create YTMs
for each of 30 yearly maturities.
27We deﬁne a credit event as a major change in a bond’s credit spread from one month to the
next. Among the set of bonds that experience such shocks, we exclude bonds with less than
two years until maturity.33 We also exclude bonds that have already fallen below a ﬂat price of
$80 (which would be the second piece of bad news about the ﬁrm). Furthermore, we exclude
bonds where the post-credit-shock price is above $95. This exclusion helps avoid identifying a
coding error as a credit-event.34
The FID does not readily identify ﬂoating rate bonds. Unnoticed, these bonds’ spreads
could be miscalculated, giving rise to spurious credit events when none occurred. We eliminate
ﬂoating rate bonds from the sample by investigating their description in the Securities Data
Corporation database and by checking that the standard deviation of a bond’s coupon in the
FID is zero.
With these qualiﬁcations, we obtain 52,828 instances where spreads widen. Table 4 shows
the distribution of spread increases on corporate bonds in the FID over the sample period.
The vast majority of the increases are quite small. Indeed, less than 3% are more than 50 bp.
We wish to focus on rare events, yet we also wish to avoid small sample problems. Thus, we
consider all spread increases of 200 bp or more (totalling 158 bonds) as credit events.
To avoid spurious results, we investigate each of these large spread changes in the ﬁnancial
press (Lexis-Nexus and Standard and Poor’s Creditweek) to ascertain that a credit event
actually occurred. Evidence of an event includes news of a bond rating downgrade, dividend
cuts, major losses or other negative information in an earnings announcement, depressed stock
prices, a major lawsuit or accident, a subsequent default or bankruptcy, or a leverage-increasing
merger. If we cannot ﬁnd evidence of a credit shock to the bond, we also check the bond price
in Moody’s Bond Record to see if a sale price exists at a level close to our bond price. If not,
we assume it is a typo in the FID. Of the 158 bonds with wider spreads, we have evidence that
112 involve a credit event. These bonds belong to 40 ﬁrms, two of which suﬀered two episodes
of credit risk (Chrysler and RJR Nabisco). The large number of bonds relative to the number
of ﬁrms reﬂects the fact that many of the ﬁrms have numerous bonds outstanding.
Most of the credit events involve economic hardship. Many of these bonds belong to
Chrysler, which suﬀered in the 1970’s and again in 1990. Some of these occur during recession
years. Another common event is a leveraged buyout (e.g., RJR Nabisco). The third largest
33We do so because a large jump in the YTM does not necessarily imply a large negative return on very short
term bonds.
34A bond might be selling at a sizeable discount (e.g., below $80) simply because yields have risen substantially
since the bond was issued. Likewise, a bond may sell at a sizeable premium because yields have fallen since
issuance, so that even if this bond suﬀers a credit event its price might remain above $95. These types of errors
would only reduce the likelihood of ﬁnding signiﬁcant results.
28category includes banks that lent funds that are unlikely to be recovered, often because of real
estate loans in the 1990-1991 recession or loans to Latin America in the early 1980s.
Some of the corporate bonds in our sample lost substantial value in one month, and then
went on to lose additional value in ensuing months. Because it is conceivable that such bonds
were no longer considered ‘investment-grade’ in the minds of the marketplace after the ﬁrst
event, we use only the ﬁrst credit shock in a series of episodes. By a series of episodes, we
mean more than one credit shock for a bond over the course of a year. We identify 25 months
over the sample period in which a credit event ﬁrst occurs. The remaining 273 months are not
credit event months.
We compare these 25 credit event months with other months by examining how returns
of aggregate portfolios diﬀer when a credit event occurs. We investigate the impact on the
Lehman corporate bond index, the CRSP value-weighted stock index (including all NYSE,
AMEX and Nasdaq ﬁrms), and the Lehman Treasury index. Our initial analysis compares
credit event months with other months using t-tests. Subsequent results control for other
factors in regressions, including controlling for macroeconomic factors identiﬁed by Fleming
and Remolona (1999) and other episodes of ﬂight-to-quality (see Longstaﬀ (2004)). We expect
that credit events of large ﬁrms will have a greater impact on the market than those of small
ﬁrms. We measure size by the amount of corporate bonds outstanding and by total assets.35
A major concern is whether our bonds constitute such a large fraction of the corporate
bond index that their own price movements drive the returns on the Lehman index. This is
unlikely as our events usually involve only a single ﬁrm in any given month. The month with
the largest number of aﬀected bonds is September 1990, during which 11 ﬁrms and 27 bonds
are classiﬁed as experiencing a credit event. These do not drive the index, as 3811 corporate
bonds are in the index that month. Furthermore, we ﬁnd similar results (unreported) if we
include only those months where a single ﬁrm suﬀered a credit shock.
6.2 Results
We ﬁrst compare average returns in the Treasury, corporate bond and stock markets in the
months in which credit events occur to the average returns during those months when no event
occurred. We focus on returns to the corporate bond index in excess of Treasury returns.
Table 5 shows that in the months in which a credit shock occurred the average excess return
on the corporate bond index is negative and signiﬁcantly lower than the return in the other
35Corporate bonds outstanding is the sum of bonds in the FID for the issuer’s six-digit cusip, which can be
inaccurate if cusips vary across a ﬁrm’s bond issues. Total assets is for the year in which the credit event occurs
and comes from Compustat, except for one ﬁrm whose assets are from Moody’s Transportation Manual.
29273 months (-0.33% in months with a credit event and +0.06% in other months). As expected,
the diﬀerence in excess returns is mainly driven by the largest ﬁrms: measured by bonds
outstanding, these ﬁrms’ events lead to an average excess corporate bond return of -1.05%;
among ﬁrms with the greatest assets, the average drop was 53 bp. These negative excess
returns often occur with ﬂights to quality or other times when Treasury returns are unusually
large. Returns on stocks are unaﬀected by these credit shocks on average. This would be
expected if a large fraction of the credit events stem from leveraged buyouts and other events
that are positive news for shareholders.
What if causality runs from Treasuries to corporate bonds in Table 5? If Federal Reserve
easing due to a weak economy causes high Treasury returns just at the time when perceived
credit risk is increasing, we might see similar market returns. If so, then a large number of
credit spread increases (reﬂecting the weak economy) would randomly result in at least one
corporate bond suﬀering a 200bp spread increase. First, we note this is highly unlikely given
that our event months are identiﬁed both by a large spread increase and news in the ﬁnancial
press indicating a reason for the jump. However, we can also test this story by investigating
the 273 months that are not associated with a credit event to see if highest returns in the
Treasury market often cause higher spreads. Speciﬁcally, we examine the 25 months with
the best Treasury returns and test the excess return for the corporate bond market during
those months. We ﬁnd they actually have signiﬁcantly positive excess returns on corporates,
indicating again that Treasury returns do not cause the observed corporate bond events.
6.3 Regression Analysis
The t-tests in Table 5 implicitly assume that only credit shocks aﬀect monthly asset returns,
as other factors are ignored. In Table 6 we report regressions that control for other eﬀects,
such as macroeconomic factors. In the corporate bond and stock market regressions we also
include the slope of the term structure, as Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) show that it predicts
recessions. For the Treasury return regression, we do not include the slope of the Treasury
curve as an explanatory variable, as it may cause a spurious relationship in the estimation. To
control for the eﬀect of changes in real rates, we also include the current month’s change in
the actual Federal Funds rate or alternatively the Federal Funds rate relative to inﬂation (the
Taylor rule variable: FF-inﬂation-2 percent (see Taylor (1993)).
We also include measures of ﬂight to quality (FTQ) in the Treasury market: an indicator
variable for instances of FTQ that are not related to the credit events we identify and changes
in institutional money market mutual fund ﬂows. Longstaﬀ argues that changes in money fund
30ﬂows are indicative of changes in sentiment that occur with a FTQ. However, money funds
were in their infancy at the start of our sample period, leading to very high growth rates that
undoubtedly do not reﬂect such changes in sentiment. Nevertheless, we investigate the eﬀects
for comparison sake.
Our indicator variable for the other FTQ episodes is based on information culled from
the ﬁnancial press. For the part of the sample from June 1979 on, we set the indicator to
one whenever the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) uses the phrase “ﬂight to quality” to explain
why prices of Treasuries have risen in that calendar month. If the WSJ uses the phrase to
describe a long term trend (say 3 months) in Treasury prices, we do not count it as FTQ. For
the period from 1973 to May 1979, the WSJ index is not available in electronic form and we
search for references to FTQ in three sources: (1) the weekly write-up of the bond market
in Moody’s Bond Survey; ((2) market commentary of Aubrey Lanston (various issues, 1973-
1979), a government bond trading ﬁrm; and (3)Lexis-Nexus. Treasury securities” If any of the
sources mention FTQ in Treasuries comparable to those used for the WSJ, we set the indicator
to one for that month.
We obtain closing VIX implied volatilities from the CBOE website (data begins in 1986).
Corporate bond upgrade to downgrade ratios are obtained from Moody’s Investors Service, as
are monthly default rates. Because the VIX severely limits the time span of analysis, we proxy
for the VIX with historical stock return volatility (volatility is calculated using the variance of
daily returns on the S&P 500, including dividends).
The eﬀects of credit events on corporate bonds in Table 6 are similar to those found in the t-
tests, again with a larger eﬀect occurring when the credit event is associated with bigger ﬁrms.
(These regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by the Newey-West
method using ﬁve lags). In the ﬁrst column of Table 6, which uses an indicator for all credit
shocks regardless of ﬁrm size, excess corporate returns are signiﬁcantly lower in credit event
months. Meanwhile, the signs of the control variables are largely as expected: a steep yield
curve implies a strong economy and thus a lower chance of default, while Fed tightening
indicates that the peak in the current business cycle has arrived (with defaults increasing
soon). The trade deﬁcit situation is also very signiﬁcant, which may reﬂect the fact that the
corporate bond market includes more exporters than the economy in general. Defaults and
rating changes are not signiﬁcant, regardless of the lead/lag relationship used in the regression
(results not reported).
Several of the macro variables are insigniﬁcant, and are dropped for the sake of parsimony
in the remaining speciﬁcations. Likewise the FTQ indicator is not important for the corporate
31bond market. (In results not reported we also ﬁnd that using the on the run/oﬀ the run spread
as a proxy for FTQ is not signiﬁcant.) This likely reﬂects the relative safety of bonds in these
other episodes that are not related to credit risk in the bond market.
In the next two columns of Table 6 we report regressions of excess bond returns where
the credit event months are split into those with large ﬁrms and those with small ﬁrm shocks
(size is measured by ﬁrm assets). As in the t-tests, the impact is greatest in months when
large ﬁrms experience credit shocks. These two columns diﬀer in the treatment of stock return
volatility. One includes the VIX volatility measure, which is only available from 1986. The
VIX aﬀects the coeﬃcient on the indicator for the October 1987 crash as well as the default
rate and ratio of upgrades to downgrades, but this largely reﬂects the time period for which
the VIX is available. We further consider the role of volatility by replacing the VIX with the
monthly standard deviation of daily S&P 500 returns (including dividends). This variable has
no discernible impact on corporate bond returns. We also include institutional money fund
ﬂow innovations in the second model, but its coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.
The two middle columns of Table 6 show the results of regressions explaining Treasury
returns. The corporate credit shocks have a positive impact on Treasury returns, suggestive
of a ﬂight to quality eﬀect. The coeﬃcient on the FTQ indicator implies this phenomenon
occurs in many more situations than just credit events. While the credit shock indicator has
a coeﬃcient of 54 bp, the other instances of FTQ have an average impact of more than 70 bp.
The October 1987 stock market crash likely has a much larger FTQ impact. The model in the
second Treasury speciﬁcation indicates that credit shocks mainly impact the Treasury market
when they involve large ﬁrms.36
The last two columns of Table 6 shows regressions analyzing the eﬀect of our credit shocks
on excess stock returns. Unlike the t-tests, these estimations indicate that CRSP stocks suﬀer
in months with credit events. These regressions control for macroeconomic factors, such as
the Federal Funds rate and consumer conﬁdence. For stocks, higher consumer conﬁdence
always leads to higher returns. This variable impinges on the signiﬁcance of the credit events,
suggesting that conﬁdence drops when these events occur. In the second speciﬁcation, large
ﬁrm credit event months are signiﬁcantly negative once we drop the consumer conﬁdence
variable.
Our results suggest that unexpected credit events lead to signiﬁcant losses on a corporate
bond portfolio. This is consistent with our model’s assumption that credit events aﬀect the
pricing kernel.
36In results not reported, the on the run/oﬀ the run spread and the money fund variable are not signiﬁcant.
327 Conclusion
Empirical studies ﬁnd that only a small fraction of investment grade credit spreads can be
explained in terms of covariance of bond returns with a proxy for the pricing kernel. Reduced
form models of default attribute the large, unexplained residuals as compensation for jump-to-
default risk, but do not investigate how these default events covary with their pricing kernel
proxy. Moreover, the models tested have precluded the most economically reasonable justiﬁ-
cation for JTD to be priced, namely, a contagion channel, where the aggregate corporate bond
index reacts adversely to a credit event. In this paper, we consider two frameworks: one where
JTD risk is priced because of its impact on aggregate corporate bond indices, and one where
JTD risk is priced because defaults provide information regarding a hidden macro-economic
state. Simple calibrations of our models indicate that JTD premia have an upper bound of a
few basis points and that, especially at the long end, contagion premia should dominate JTD
premia, and could potentially account for a signiﬁcant portion of credit spreads. Since the
framework proposed is tractable in capturing contagion even among a large number of ﬁrms,
we suspect the model should also be useful for the pricing of CDO tranches.
We also ﬁnd empirical evidence for credit contagion by studying the response of corporate
bonds, Treasuries and equity indices to ‘surprise’ credit events incurred by individual ﬁrms.
These events lead to market-wide increases in credit spreads, and downward jumps in risk-free
rates. Furthermore, consistent with intuition, we ﬁnd that credit events of large ﬁrms have a
more signiﬁcant eﬀect on the market than credit events of small ﬁrms. The positive impact
on Treasury returns of credit events is substantial and seems robust. It is consistent with
the notion of ‘ﬂight to quality,’ and indeed with the predictions of our simple ‘fragile beliefs’
equilibrium model.
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8.2 Technical appendix for the updating equation
Here we provide a heuristic derivation for the updating equation (38).37 Since defaults are
triggered by point processes, investors observe, at most, one event per unit time. Deﬁne
d1t ≡ d1
{i<t}




as the vector of jump events. Consider ﬁrst the case where no default is
observed in a period dt. Using the deﬁnition of conditional probability, and keeping terms only
to O(dt), we obtain:
Pr
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˜ S = s; d1t = 0
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Again using conditional expectations, we ﬁnd that the process for s(t), conditional upon
no ﬁrm defaulting during the interval (t;t + dt), evolves via
s(t + dt)|(d1t=0) ≡ Pr
[
˜ S = s
   
 d1t = 0; Ft
]
37More rigorously, the result is a direct application of theorem 19.6 page 332 in Lipster and Shiryaev (see also
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where we have used equation (37) and the fact that
∑M
s′=1 
s′(t) = 1 in the second-to-last line.










In contrast, if one ﬁrm (e.g., ﬁrm i) defaults during the interval dt, then, for all states-j,
we obtain the updating:
Pr
[
˜ S = s; d1
{i<t} = 1
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   Ft
]
= s(t)is(t−)dt: (83)
Hence, it follows that, conditional on ﬁrm-i defaulting during the interval (t;t + dt), the
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8.3 The no-jump condition
For simplicity, and since a counter-example suﬃces, we consider the case where the intensity












































So clearly E[dM(t)] ̸= 0.
8.4 Proof of the bond price formula















where under the ˜ P measure the dynamics of xi(t) is:
dis(t) = i (is − is(t))dt + is
√
is(t)dZi(t)








To that eﬀect it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd functions A();B() such that the process M((t);t) =
e−
∫ t
0 (u)dueA(T−t)−B(T−t)(t) is a ˜ P martingale. Applying the Itˆ o-Doeblin rule to M((t);t)




] = −A′ + B′ − B( − ) +
1
2
B22 −  = 0
A′ = −B (90)
−B′ = B +
1
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B22 − 1 (91)









5 0.033 122.8 2.2 1.19
10 0.023 121.8 3.2 1.27
15 0.018 121.0 4.0 1.33
20 0.016 120.4 4.6 1.39
Table 1: We decompose 125bp of excess return into that due to jump-to-default risk and that due to contagion
risk for select values of the constant relative risk aversion coeﬃcient . Parameter values are ΓD = 0:6,

P = 0:002 and N = 1000.
 Γ
implied





5 0.022 53.5 1.5 1.12
10 0.015 52.9 2.1 1.17
15 0.012 52.4 3.6 1.21
20 0.010 52.0 3.0 1.25
Table 2: We decompose 55bp of excess return into that due to jump-to-default risk and that due to contagion
risk for select values of the constant relative risk aversion coeﬃcient . Parameter values are ΓD = 0:6,

P = 0:002 and N = 1000.
 Γ
implied





5 0.034 124.6 0.4 1.19
10 0.023 124.4 0.5 1.27
15 0.019 124.3 0.7 1.33
20 0.016 122.2 0.8 1.39
Table 3: We decompose 125bp of excess return into that due to jump in spread risk and that due to contagion
risk for select values of the constant relative risk aversion coeﬃcient . Parameter values are ΓD = 0:10,

P = 0:002 and N = 1000.
43Number of Average Excess Average
observations Percentage Return Return Duration
Over 10 percentage points 7 0.01% -31.33% -31.37% 2.36%
5 to 10 percentage points 6 0.01% -17.43% -16.79% 3.17%
3 to 5 percentage points 32 0.06% -12.40% -12.91% 4.26%
2 to 3 percentage points 113 0.21% -7.74% -8.93% 4.57%
1.5 to 2 percentage points 146 0.28% -5.42% -6.69% 4.76%
1.25 to 1.5 percentage points 131 0.25% -4.08% -5.50% 5.10%
1 to 1.25 percentage points 273 0.52% -2.85% -4.08% 4.87%
0.75 to 1 percentage points 572 1.08% -2.00% -3.63% 5.70%
0.5 to 0.75 percentage points 1919 3.63% -1.08% -2.84% 6.30%
0.25 to 0.5 percentage points 5776 10.93% -0.54% -1.18% 6.39%
Less than 0.25 percentage points 43853 83.01% 0.08% -0.23% 7.71%
Table 4: Distribution of Spread Increases
Size measured Size measured
by bonds outstanding by total assets
Events Events Events Events
All Involving Involving Involving Involving
Events Large Issuers Small Issuers Large Issuers Small Issuers
Number of events 25 11 14 13 12
Corporate Bond Returns:
in months with events -0.33 -1.05 0.24 -0.53 -0.11
in months with no events 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04
Diﬀerence in returns 0.39 1.12 -0.22 0.58 0.15
T-statistic 1.74 3.42 -1.50 1.91 0.47
p-value 0.084 0.001 0.149 0.057 0.641
Treasury Bond Returns:
in months with events 1.28 1.22 1.33 1.55 0.30
in months with no event 0.70 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.76
Diﬀerence in returns -0.59 -0.49 -0.62 -0.84 0.46
T-statistic -1.70 -0.96 -1.37 -3.05 0.72
p-value 0.090 0.336 0.173 0.008 0.471
Stock Market Returns:
in months with events 0.80 0.05 1.38 0.24 1.40
in months with no event 1.13 1.14 1.09 1.14 1.09
Diﬀerence in returns 0.33 -1.09 -0.30 0.90 -0.31
T-statistic 0.36 0.57 -0.25 0.72 -0.24
p-value 0.721 0.578 0.807 0.474 0.811
Table 5: Mean Excess Returns of Corporate Bond, Treasury and Stock Indices When Credit Events Occur
44Corporate Bond Treasury Stock Market
Excess Returns Bond Returns Excess Returns
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -0.22 0.10 -0.09 1.19 1.19 -1.09 -0.95
(-1.88) (1.64) (-0.84) (5.20) (5.18) (-4.28) (-3.66)
Credit event month -0.43 - - 0.54 - -0.52 -
(-2.14) (1.72) (-1.61)
Large ﬁrm credit event month - -0.39 -0.77 - 0.67 - -0.79
(-2.67) (-3.23) (2.08) (-2.52)
Small ﬁrm credit event month - -0.03 -0.20 - 0.42 - -0.50
(-0.38) (-0.80) (0.78) (-0.92)
Change in Fed Funds -0.22 - - -0.32 -0.32 0.29 0.37
(-1.63) (-1.64) (-1.64) (1.37) (1.79)
Change in CPI - - - -1.14 -1.15 1.02 0.67
- - - (-2.75) (-2.75) (2.21) (0.48)
Change in Taylor rule - 0.07 -0.27 - - -
(0.54) (-2.30)
Change in defaults 14.45 -14.95 16.16 - - - -
(0.90) (-2.04) (1.01)
Change in upgrade/downgrade ratio 0.02 0.08 0.04 - - - -
(0.07) (1.62) (0.13)
Slope of the yield curve 0.35 0.008 0.35 - - -0.07 -0.06
(3.26) (0.17) (3.28) (-0.58) (-0.45)
Change in consumer conﬁdence -0.79 - - -4.94 -4.93 5.01 -
(-0.80) (-2.63) (-2.61) (2.66)
Change in current account 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.12 -0.13 -0.19
(2.93) (1.54) (2.76) (1.25) (1.16) (-1.28) (-1.68)
Change in payrolls 0.0003 - - -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.77) (1.33) (-1.27) (1.34) (1.22)
Change in IP -0.0006 - - - - - -
(-0.006)
Indicator for 1987 crash -1.32 0.80 -0.59 2.82 2.81 -3.03 -3.04
(-5.73) (1.15) (-0.85) (8.37) (8.32) (-9.24) (-8.70)
Flight to quality indicator 0.28 - - 0.72 0.72 -0.70 -0.75
(1.55) (2.43) (2.43) (-2.35) (-2.45)
Shock to institutional money funds - -.02 - -
(-.22)
Change in VIX (post 1986) - -0.047 - - - - -
(-2.52)
Stock return volatility - - -9.14 - - - -
(-0.66)
Adjusted R
2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.11
Table 6: Regression of Eﬀects of Credit Events on Corporate bonds, Treasuries and Stocks
45Input Parameters Implied Parameters
Scenario N 
P Γdef Sharpe Excess  Mkt  diff cont def Γcont
Ratio Return (bp) (bp) (bp)
1 1000 0.001 0.5 0.2 0.024 0.08 0.12 1.67 107 133 1 0.089
2 1000 0.001 0.5 0.2 0.024 0.10 0.12 1.67 167 73 1 0.066
3 1000 0.001 0.5 0.2 0.024 0.115 0.12 1.67 220 19 0 0.034
4 1000 0.001 0.5 0.2 0.03 0.10 0.15 1.33 133 166 1 0.111
5 1000 0.001 0.5 0.2 0.03 0.13 0.15 1.33 225 74 0 0.074
6 1000 0.001 0.5 0.5 0.024 0.04 0.048 10.42 167 73 1 0.026
7 1000 0.001 0.5 0.5 0.03 0.04 0.06 8.33 133 165 2 0.044
8 1000 0.001 1 0.2 0.024 0.08 0.12 1.67 107 132 1 0.089
9 1000 0.01 0.5 0.2 0.024 0.08 0.12 1.67 107 131 2 0.028
10 1500 0.01 0.5 0.2 0.024 0.08 0.12 1.67 107 131 2 0.023
11 20 0.01 0.5 0.2 0.024 0.08 0.12 1.67 107 117 17 0.184
12 2 0.01 0.5 0.2 0.024 0.08 0.12 1.67 107 81 53 0.765
Table 7: Implied contagion risk premia for select inputs.
Scenario N V p Γ;i Γk;i Γk Jump to default Contagion
premium (bp) premium (bp)
1 1000 0.25 0.001 0.50 0.0039 0.5 2.5 19.5
2 1000 0.50 0.001 0.71 0.0039 0.5 3.5 27.6
3 1000 0.25 0.001 0.50 0.0076 0.5 2.5 38.0
4 1500 0.25 0.001 0.41 0.0039 0.5 2.5 23.9
5 1000 0.25 0.001 0.50 0.0039 1.0 5.0 19.5
6 100 0.25 0.001 1.58 0.0039 0.5 2.5 6.2
7 1000 0.25 0.01 0.16 0.0039 0.5 25 61.7
8 1000 0.50 0.01 0.22 0.0039 0.5 25 87.2
9 1000 2.50 0.01 0.50 0.0039 0.5 25 195.0
Table 8: Implied contagion risk premia for select inputs.
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